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Abstract — Risk assessment is a critical decision making 
process during the Security Certification and 
Accreditation (C&A) process. However, existing 
infrastructure-wide C&A processes in real world are 
challenged by the ever increasing complexity of 
information systems and their diverse socio-technical 
operational environments. The lack of an explicit model 
and the associated uncertainties of software behavior are 
two main reasons that directly impact the effectiveness of 
risk assessment as well as the subjective decisions made 
based on the different level of domain expertise. In this 
paper, we propose a method for a probabilistic model-
driven risk assessment on security requirements.  The 
security requirements and their causal relationships are 
represented using MEBN (Multi-Entities Bayesian 
Networks) logic that constructs an explicit formal risk 
assessment model that supports evidence-driven 
arguments. The proposed approach is described by using 
real-world C&A scenarios to show not only its feasibility 
for security requirements risk assessment but also its 
effectiveness for the sensitivity analysis to identify critical 
influences among information entities in a complex and 
uncertain operational environment.  
Keywords – Probabilistic risk assessment, Security requirements, 
Bayesian network, Certification, Accreditation, Sensitivity analysis 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The government, defense, and private sectors spend billions 
of dollars every year in securing software systems that support 
their critical businesses/missions. According to a recent survey, 
among 1,300 global companies, and government and non-profit 
agencies in 55 nations, the compliance with regulations has 
taken the lead as the primary driver of security efforts in an 
organization, surpassing worms and viruses. However, various 
reports [8] [11] [31] indicate that the process of measuring 
compliance with security Certification & Accreditation (C&A) 
requirements is often irregular and unreliable. As a result, C&A 
processes lack consistent, complete and measurable outcomes 
and fail to provide adequate and timely information to 
understand security risks and make informed decisions.   
Due to the ever increasing complexity of information 
systems and their diverse socio-technical operational 
environments, the associated risk assessment processes need to 
handle various types of uncertainties of the information. These 
uncertainties are inherent to the specific problem domain which 
is being modeled with many underlying assumptions based on 
a prior knowledge from the previously known phenomena. In 
order to achieve probabilistic risk assessment for effective 
decision making, the nature of uncertainty in risk assessment 
must be carefully identified, expressed, propagated, 
synthesized and understood. From the risk assessment 
perspective, uncertainties are originated from various sources:  
• Consistency and completeness of the information and its 
validity: We often use different types of historic data, 
questionnaires results, etc. to support our claim, however, the 
coverage and effectiveness of the sources of the information 
are yet to be perfect to the given situation.  
• Assumptions behind the model: Risk assessment process is 
based on the models of the relationships among different risk 
factors with assumptions that are very unique and specific to 
the situation which are hard to be treated in general.  
• Dynamics of the environment: The constantly changing 
systems’ operational environments are different to one 
another and the risks of the target system are always 
expected to have new factors to be considered based on the 
changes being made (or those that will be made). 
• Subjective nature of human expertise and judgment: The 
level of human expertise on a certain subject, often becomes 
the main resource for risk assessment, for each individual is 
different and lack the ability to effectively communicate to 
converge into the final decision making points.  
Risk assessment is a process of identifying relevant 
information resources (risk factors), discovering their 
relationships, and integrating them to form a risk assessment 
argument. In regards to the uncertainties, we must address four 
issues: 1) how the uncertainty of information should be 
understood and expressed (for problem understanding); 2) how 
different pieces of information are integrated (to build a causal 
model); 3) how new information can be incorporated (for 
model evolution); and 4) what if the operational situation is 
changed (for the changing risk factors and their adaptation).  
During the process of risk assessment, experts can make not 
only judgments, but also meta-judgments [13], that is, 
judgments about the degree of certainty that they have in their 
judgments. Since the judgments can be precisely modeled 
through an appropriate probability distribution, we, therefore, 
use the probability theory to express uncertainties in the 
domain of risk assessment. In addition, we notice that the 
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experts can do better in making judgments at a lower level, or 
at a more observable level (e.g. the configuration correctness of 
a certain countermeasure) but less effective at a higher level 
(e.g. the level of risk of the entire system). This is because, at a 
higher level, making a decision requires a more complex 
process to integrate or synthesize different information coming 
from lower levels, especially when there are hundreds of or 
even thousands of risk factors involved in the inspecting 
systems (or network of systems). Therefore, we use the 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) that provides a theoretical 
foundation to incorporate such accumulated evidences. Also, 
we propose a way to make our probabilistic risk assessment 
model parametric, so that the risk assessment model can be 
parameterized or instantiated automatically, instead of building 
a new model, whenever the operational situation is changed.  
In this paper, as an application example, we focus on the 
Department of Defense Information Technology Security C&A 
Process (DITSCAP) that defines certification as a 
comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical 
security features of an information system and other safeguards 
made in support of the accreditation process, to establish the 
extent to which a particular design and implementation meets a 
set of specified security requirements [2].   
II. RELATED WORK 
Several risk assessment tools and approaches are proposed 
in order to determine threats/vulnerabilities in the early phase 
of software development life cycle. CORAS [5] and Risk-
Management Framework [32] propose their own 
methodological steps, but lack specific guidelines to 
interoperate with C&A activities and appropriately utilize the 
evidences gathered for C&A requirements into the risk 
assessment process. 
Several quantitative risk assessment methods exist. Butler 
[6] proposes a SAEM method which is a cost-benefit analysis 
process for analyzing security design decisions based on the 
comparison of a “threat index”. However, it is based on some 
impractical assumptions.  Ekelhart [9] uses security ontology to 
improve quantitative risk analysis and promote the common 
understanding of the involved risk factors. However, it is not 
sufficient to identify how these risk factors can contribute to 
the entire risk assessment process. Quantitative risk-based 
requirements reasoning in [12] uses PACT as a “filter” 
arranged in series to find out a proportion of likelihood or the 
impact of risk factor. However, it lacks the ability to represent 
the impacts among multiple risk factors. The SSRAM model in 
[28] provides a prioritization that aids in determining how the 
risks identified will be addressed in different phases of 
software development. However, it lacks a baseline for 
systematically identifying potential risks and reasoning about 
their relationships and interactions in a real operational 
environment. 
In regards to the use of probability theory and modeling 
techniques in risk assessment, Littlewood uses Bayesian 
approach to assess the reliability of fault-tolerant software [26]. 
He also used Multi-legged arguments to increase the 
confidence in dependability arguments [27]. Gregoriades and 
Sutcliffe [19] developed a probabilistic model to reason about 
the system reliability that predicts human and machine 
reliabilities with given input variables representing the scenario 
and ranges of environmental conditions. Fenton and Maiden 
[15] and Neil et al. [30] have developed large BBN models to 
assess risk at the system level, such as the reliability of system 
engineering processes for developing ships, vehicles, or the 
operational reliability of air traffic control systems. Fenton [14] 
indicated that BBN is the most effective model in software 
quality management through comparison with six other types 
of methods. Hui, et al. [22] also introduced a method to build a 
BBN for software risk assessment. But these BBN approaches 
are limited since the number of nodes and structures of their 
models are fixed and therefore, can only be used in a certain 
specific situation. When the given situation changes, the model 
needs to be modified manually to fit the new situation, even 
these changes are simply to add some repeated nodes or 
substructures. This is partly because standard BBN lacks the 
sufficient expressive power.  
To address this limitation, a number of languages have been 
developed that represent probabilistic knowledge as modular 
units with repeated substructures that can be composed into 
complex domain models [24]. These include pattern theory 
[20], hidden Markov models [10], the plates language 
implemented in BUGS [18], Object-Oriented Bayesian 
networks (OOBN) [23], probabilistic relational models (PRMs) 
[17], and MEBN [24]. In contrast, MEBN provides a more 
flexible, coherent way to facilitate representation of knowledge 
at a natural level of granularity. It combines the expressive 
power of first-order logic with a sound and logically consistent 
treatment of BBN. MEBN fragments (MFrags) are parametric 
causal fragments and can be instantiated and combined to form 
arbitrarily complex graphical probability model. A feature of 
MEBN not present in PRMs, plates or OOBNs is the use of 
context constraints to specify logical conditions that determine 
whether one random variable influences another.  
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Modeling C&A Requirements and Risk Components  
To systematically identify and reason about the risk 
components expressed in natural language C&A security 
requirements descriptions, we extend the Common Criteria 
security model [1]. The resulting model in Figure 1, explains 
the relationships between security requirements and risk 
components.   
D
A
M
A
G
E
*
1..*
MISSION 
CRITICALITY
HAVE* 1
*
RISKS
INCREASE
L
E
A
D
 T
O
RE
DU
CE
1..*
1..*
1..*
1..*
1..*
*
*
HAVE
EXPLOIT
1..* *
HAVE
* *
MITIGATES
*1..*
THREATS
SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
APPLY TO
*
1..*
SUGGEST
DR
IV
EN
 BY
P
R
E
V
E
N
T
1..*
1..*
*
1..*
*
*
VULNERABILITIES
COUNTER
MEASURES
ASSETS
 
Figure 1. Requirements and Risk Model [16] 
The risk components and their correlations in the 
Requirements and Risk Model (hereinafter called the Risk 
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Model) can be simply described as: the assets have mission 
criticalities and risks, threats can exploit the vulnerabilities to 
damage the assets thus increase their risks. The security 
requirements driven by threats suggest countermeasures to 
mitigate the vulnerabilities thus prevent the vulnerabilities and 
reduce the risks, whilst countermeasures may also introduce 
vulnerabilities which can lead to risks. The final goal is to 
evaluate the risk of assets in a given situation.  
Based on the model in Figure 1, domain experts identify the 
relevant risk components and map them into the concepts in the 
domain-specific taxonomies of threats, assets, vulnerabilities, 
and countermeasures modeled in the Problem Domain 
Ontology (PDO) [25]. For example, Figure 2 shows the 
explication of multi-dimensional domain concepts for the 
DITSCAP “Boundary Defense” requirement [3].    
Name: Boundary Defense
Information Assurance 
Service: Confidentiality
Description: Boundary defense 
mechanisms to include firewalls 
and network intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) are deployed at 
the enclave boundary to the wide 
area network, at layered or 
internal enclave boundaries and 
at key points in the network, as 
required. All Internet access is 
proxied through Internet access 
points that are under the 
management and control of the 
enclave and are isolated from 
other DoD information systems 
by physical or technical means.
C&A PROCESS GOAL:
DEFINE SYSTEM 
INTERFACES
(DOMAIN EXPERTISE)
VULNERABILITY:
INTERNET ACCESS NOT 
PROXIED
(RELATED 
COUNTERMEASURE)
THREAT:
UNAUTHORIZED 
NETWORK TRAFFIC
(DOMAIN 
EXPERTISE)
THREAT:
UNAUTHORIZED 
INTERNET ACCESS
(DOMAIN 
EXPERTISE)
VULNERABILITY:
USE OF 
TAMPERED SOFTWARE
(RELATED 
REQUIREMENT)
REQUIREMENT:
OUTSOURCED 
APPLICATION SUBJECT 
TO DoD ENCLAVE 
BOUNDARY DEFENSE
(REQUIREMENTS 
CROSS-REFERENCE)
REQUIREMENT: 
ACQUISITION 
STANDARDS
(REQUIREMENTS 
CROSS-REFERENCE)
VIEWPOINT:
CONFIDENTIALITY
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
VULNERABILITY:
FIREWALL AND IDS
MIS-CONFIGURATION
(RELATED 
COUNTERMEASURE)
ASSET:
ENCLAVE
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
COUNTERMEASURE:
MANAGED INTERNET 
ACCESS CONTROL 
POINTS (DMZ) 
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
COUNTERMEASURE:
INSTALL FIREWALLS & IDS 
AT KEY POINTS IN THE 
ENCLAVE WITH APPROPRIATE 
CONFIGURATIONS
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
ASSET:
DoD INFORMATION 
SYSTEM
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
VIEWPOINT:
ADMINISTRATOR
(STAKEHOLDER
RESPONSIBILITY)
 
Figure 2. Analyzing a DITSCAP Requirement 
IV. PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
In the Requirements and Risk Model shown in Figure 1, we 
can identify two types of links, the Information Discovery Link, 
and the Causal Relationship Link. The former has been used to 
discover and understand multi-dimensional correlations among 
C&A requirements [16] as shown in Figure 2. The latter, we 
believe, is helpful to extract the causal relationships and reason 
about their impacts within the process of risk assessment.  
The domain of risk assessment is full of uncertainties and 
effective decisions must be made to answer questions, for 
example, “How likely a certain threat will occur?” or “How 
effective a countermeasure can mitigate certain vulnerability?” 
etc. As mentioned in section II, BBNs have been widely 
applied as a probabilistic reasoning technique in software 
engineering and other domains. BBNs allow the construction of 
probabilistic models involving large numbers of interrelated 
uncertain hypotheses and have the ability to combine 
qualitative expert knowledge with quantitative measures of 
plausibility and statistical data. In Figure 1, the risk is causally 
related to a certain set of security requirements, threats, 
vulnerabilities, countermeasures and other risk factors (here 
risk factors represent not only the risk components in the Risk 
Model, but also their properties related to risk assessment, e.g., 
the maintenance of countermeasure etc.), therefore, we propose 
to model the risk assessment by using Bayesian probability to 
perform the probabilistic risk assessment.   
A. Motivations and Benefits  
In a security C&A process, our probabilistic risk 
assessment is motivated by the following needs to: 1) Make the 
process of risk assessment more explicit and systematic to 
support better decisions under uncertainty; 2) Make risk 
assessment techniques be based on probabilistic metrics that 
can be evaluated systematically with little involvement of 
subjective measures from domain experts [34]; 3) Classify the 
relevant risk components and map their causal relationships to 
concepts in the domain-specific taxonomies of threats, assets, 
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures modeled in the PDO; 4) 
Use BBN to represent and model uncertainty among 
dependability requirements in C&A process then, analyze 
causal relationships and impacts qualitatively and 
quantitatively among different risk components; and 5) 
Automatically generate BBN according to the given risk 
assessment scenarios.   
Also, our probabilistic risk assessment approach has the 
following benefits: 1) Different stakeholders can have an 
explicit and common understanding of the risk assessment 
process and the decision rationale; 2) Every phase of risk 
assessment process is arguable and can be re-evaluated based 
on the common understanding; and 3) Simulation is possible 
through sensitivity analysis to show how different risk 
components are related to and impacted by each other. 
B. Bayesian Network for Risk Assessment  
In risk assessment, BBN can provide  stakeholders a causal 
relationship graph and inference capabilities among different 
risk components. Before building the BBN for risk assessment, 
it is worth giving a brief definition for the risk components 
discussed in our domain (adapted from [4]).   
 C&A requirement is the specification that describes the 
security conditions and constraints under which the system 
must be operated. 
 Mission criticality is related to asset, representing relative 
importance of the asset to the mission success. 
 Asset is the resource of the system that needs to be protected 
to achieve its goal 
 Threat is a potential danger to the system such as a person, 
system component or event that might result in a 
compromise of the secure operation of the system. 
 Vulnerability is a weakness in the system or a point where a 
system is susceptible to attack. This weakness could be 
exploited to violate the system security.  
 Countermeasure is an action, device, procedure or technique 
for protecting the system against threats to its secure 
operation.  
 Risk is the asset-based risk, it presents the risk extent of an 
asset can impact on the whole system.  
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We extract the causal relationship and construct the BBN 
based on the Risk Model in Figure 1. Building a BBN to model 
the risk assessment process requires a thorough enumeration of 
all the relevant risk factors and knowing correctly which risk 
factor causally influences other factors. For a complex socio-
technical system, it is very difficult to produce precise network 
structure and Node Probability Tables (NPTs) for hundreds of 
or even thousands of risk factors. In addition, different people 
have different experiences and understanding; the building 
process may be very subjective. In order to make our BBN 
reliable and justifiable, we adopt an objective and formal way 
to capture the process knowledge of experts’ risk assessment. 
Normally, there are two methods to build a BBN: 1) 
learning the network structure based on the given data set; and 
2) constructing a network structure according to expert’s 
experience [21]. In this paper, we adopt the second approach 
due to two reasons: 1) Constructing network structure by 
learning requires a lot of sample data and such data is hard to 
be collected effectively and comprehensively; and 2) We 
believe that the experts of many years’ experience can judge 
the dependent/independent and direct/indirect relationships 
between risk factors more effectively. In addition, a formal way 
of building the BBN makes the process more explicit and 
arguable, and improve the communication and understanding 
among different experts while helping to reach to an agreement.  
 
Figure 3. The process of developing causal model 
For the causal relationships extraction, we use the method 
suggested by Neil [29], proposed “building blocks” concepts, 
using “idioms” to build causal dependency diagrams. Five 
idioms are summarized as follows:  
 Definitional/synthesis idiom: This idiom can be used to 
represent definitional relationships such as X=Y/Z. Synthetic 
nodes can ease calculation or understanding, and create 
hierarchies of sub-attributes to define complex super 
attributes.   
 Cause-effect idiom: This cause connection can be determined 
based on the following facts: Chronology of events in time; 
Events occur in sequence; Productive, physical or intentional 
relationship between cause and consequence; Rules for 
determining causality couched in common sense.   
 Measurement idiom: This idiom is used to model the 
uncertainty of our own ability to observe accurately. For 
example, the uncertainty of the testing accuracy is impacted 
by actual defects and detected defects.   
 Induction idiom: This idiom models the uncertainty related to 
inductive reasoning (including historical experiences) based 
on populations of similar or exchangeable members.   
 Reconciliation idiom: This idiom reconciles independent 
sources of evidence about a single attribute of a single entity, 
where these sources of evidence have been produced by 
different methods. Also, it combines uncertain definition 
model with causal inference model and combines 
information from different causal models.   
For the NPTs definition, we use the historic statistical data 
and the estimation of experts. For example, analysts can 
identify the possible types of threats and calculate or estimate 
their frequencies under the given environment. We firstly 
identify all the concerned risk factors and add them into a 
candidate pool, then identify their causal relationships 
according to the five idioms along with the Risk Model, and 
finally combine these causal fragments and build their NPTs to 
finish the construction of the BBN. Figure 3 depicts the process 
and the brief descriptions about each step are as follows:  
Step 1. The target entity should be defined. The target node 
presents our main purpose of the BBN, namely, to assess “the 
risk of asset”.  
Step 2. Identify risk components and relationships from 
Risk Model which are relevant to the target entity. In our 
example, the identified entities are ASSETS, MISSION 
CRITICALITY, THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, 
COUNTERMEASURES and the relationships are 
INCREASE, EXPLOIT, MITIGATE, LEAD_TO, REDUCE, 
DAMAGE, HAVE. Note that these extracted entities or 
relationships may not be used in BBN directly. For example, 
we replace COUNTERMEASURE with 
COUNTERMEASURE_EFFECTIVENESS because we 
concern the effectiveness of countermeasures to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities, not the costs of countermeasures. There are two 
advantages by doing so. Firstly, it is for better understanding 
and communication, secondly, it tells analysts on what aspects 
(effectiveness or costs) of risk components they should 
concentrate in the following steps.   
Step 3. Elicit risk factors based on identified risk 
components in step 2. We elicit all risk factors which have 
direct impact on each of the risk components. For example, we 
can elicit that the effectiveness of countermeasure is impacted 
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directly by its configuration and applicability. Based on the 
extent that threat can exploit vulnerabilities, we can elicit 
vulnerability exposure and ease of exploit. In our example, the 
rest of elicited entities may be applicability of countermeasure, 
configuration of countermeasure, vulnerability type, and 
vulnerability ease of exploit, vulnerability exposure to public, 
threat type, and threat frequency of occurrence. 
Step 4. Continue to elicit risk factors based on the new risk 
factors elicited in step 3. This step continues until we reach the 
“leaf” risk factors where the probabilities are available (i.e., 
directly from the statistical data or experts’ direct estimation). 
In our example, the complexity of countermeasure, usability of 
countermeasure, maintenance of countermeasure, 
countermeasure type, personal skills, and training plan can be 
elicited in this step.  
CM_Complextity
CM_Maintenance
CM_Usability
CM_Configuration
ThreatsPotential
ResidualVulnerability
MissionCriticality
RiskOfAsset
CM_Effectiveness
(a)
CM_Effectiveness
CM_Configuration CM_Applicability
(b)
Identify risk factors for
CM_Effectiveness
Identify risk factors for
CM_Configuration
(c)
Training plan
Personal skills
Identify leaf risk factors for
CM_Configuration
 
Figure 4. Identify (a) risk components related to target entity; (b) risk factors 
related to risk components; (c) risk factors until to reach leaf risk factors.  
Step 5. Build elementary causal building blocks (idioms). 
We identify the entities from the candidate pool. We begin at 
the root level (i.e., the risk components level), then to the leaf 
risk factor level. Firstly, we identify risk components related to 
our target entity, namely, “RiskOfAsset”, so 
“ThreatsPotential”, “MissionCriticality”, “Vulnerability”, 
“CM_Effectiveness” can be identified, as shown in Figure 4 
(a), then we identity risk factors for each of the parents in 
previous step, for example, we identify the risk factors of 
“CM_Applicability” and CM_Configuration” that are related 
to “CM_Effectiveness”, as shown in Figure 4 (b), continue 
this process until all the newly identified entities become leaf 
risk factors. For example, we can indentify from the candidate 
pool that “personal skills”, “CM_Complextity”, 
“CM_Maintenance”, “CM_Usability” and “training plan” 
have impacts on “CM_Configuration”, as shown in Figure 4 
(c). Note that the causal fragments obtained here may be 
modified in the following steps.  
Step 6. Sometimes the existing entities in the pool cannot 
be grouped directly in a reasonable way, so we should 
introduce “connector entities” to connect them. For example, 
we have to introduce the inherent vulnerability and residual 
vulnerability to reflect the mitigation effectiveness after certain 
countermeasures are applied. Also, after the new connector 
entities are introduced, we should go back to step 4. 
Step 7. Evaluate obtained fragments. Once we get the 
initial causal fragments, we should evaluate them based on the 
needs and constraints within our domain. If the building block 
(idiom) is not suitable, it should be revised. In our example, 
though the “personal skills” and “training plan” have impacts 
on correctness of countermeasures, but our current discussion 
does not take much of practical operational details into account, 
so we will discard these two entities at this moment.   
Step 8. Combine obtained fragments. It is easy to notice 
that some common entities are shared by different building 
blocks, after each building block has been re-evaluated; we can 
then combine them together based on these common entities. In 
addition, there may be some causal relationships among the 
risk factors in different fragments and they must be identified. 
For example, we can identity that the “vulnerability type” has 
impact both on “threat potential” and “countermeasure 
applicability”. Since the BBN is a Directed Acyclic Graph, we 
have to make sure that the composite model satisfies the 
constraints of BBN. Finally, the structure of BBN is obtained.  
Step 9. For each entity, it must have a finite number of 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive states. Different 
entities may have different states or measurement scales. For 
example, “threat potential” may have three states (High, 
Medium, Low), while “countermeasure maintenance” may 
have four states based on the cost (under $1000, $1000-$2000, 
$2000-$3000, more than $3000). For simplicity, we assume 
that all the entities (except the nodes ThreatType, 
VulnerabilityType and CM_Type, their states are based on 
their possible types in the given scenario) have three possible 
states: High, Medium and Low. In real-world, we can use other 
available practical measurement scale to improve the accuracy 
and understanding of our assessment.  
Step 10. Based on the historic statistical data and 
estimations from the experts, build the NPT for each entity. For 
the leaf node, directly assign the probability to each state; for 
non-leaf node, assign the probabilities to its states under all the 
possible combinations of its parents’ states. Table I shows the 
NPT of leaf node “CM_Complexity”. 
Table II shows the NPT of non-leaf node 
“CM_Effectiveness”. When the whole process is finished, the 
final BBN is constructed. The nodes in the BBN are causally 
linked and the NPTs indicate the strength of these links. Our 
final BBN is shown in Figure 5. Due to the limited space, the 
entire NPTs are not shown in the paper. 
C. Applying BBN into Operational Scenarios  
In order to assess the risk of real software systems in a 
socio-technical environment [33], we have used the operational 
scenarios of the target system as “triggers” for the discovery of 
applicable C&A requirements. After the relevant C&A 
requirements are discovered, the risk components associated 
with them can also be obtained.  
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 Figure 5. The BBN for Risk Assessment
The BBN we built in section IV.B, then can be used into 
this scenario to assess the risk for the target assets. Risk 
assessment based on operational scenarios has two main 
advantages: 1) operational scenarios of the target system can be 
easily obtained from domain experts and other artifacts (e.g. 
use cases); and 2) assumptions about the coverage of the 
assessment are already addressed in the development of the 
scenario building process. In our previous research [16], we 
have learned that each operational scenario is related to 
multiple requirements. In this situation, we can assess the risk 
for the asset in each related requirement, and then calculate its 
risk as a whole by using appropriate aggregation methods (i.e. 
weight average method). 
It is notable that the BBN shown in Figure 5 is useful when 
there is only one instance for each of the risk factors. However, 
in a real-world scenario, we have to add more nodes to 
represent each possible risk factor, but the numbers of threats, 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities are all different from 
scenario to scenario. Since it is impossible to build a BBN for 
each scenario, the expected BBN should have the ability to 
treat each instance of risk components individually, and 
systematically aggregate their impacts later together. In the 
next section, we will exploit the expressiveness and reasoning 
power of MEBN logic to address this specific problem.  
D. Modeling Risk Assessment with MEBN Logic  
1) Overview of MEBN Logic  
In the previous section, we discussed the limited 
expressiveness of the standard BBN. Normally, BBN assumes 
a simple attribute-value representation, that is, each problem 
instance involves reasoning about the fixed number of 
attributes, with only the evidence values changing from 
problem instance to problem instance [7]. Thus standard BBNs 
lack the expressive power to represent entity types (e.g., threat) 
that can be instantiated dynamically, as many times as required 
for the situations. MEBN is a good fit for this need with the 
expressive power of first-order logic with a sound and logically 
consistent treatment of uncertainty, which provides syntax, a 
set of model construction and inference processes, and 
semantics that together provide a means of defining probability 
distributions over unbounded and possibly infinite numbers of 
interrelated hypotheses [7].   
MEBN logic represents the world as comprised of entities 
that have attributes and are related to other entities. Random 
variables (RVs) represent features of entities and relationships 
among entities. Knowledge about attributes and relationships is 
expressed as a collection of MEBN fragments (MFrags) 
organized into MEBN Theories (MTheories) [24]. An MFrag 
consists of RVs, a fragment graph, and a set of local 
distributions. Each MFrag has an associated set of RVs that are 
partitioned into context, input, and resident RVs. A variable in 
an MFrag may have a list of arguments that are placeholders 
for entities in the domain and makes MFrags parameterized. 
The local probability distribution for resident RV is defined in 
the MFrag itself, through a description function which specifies 
how to assign probabilities to the given its parents. The 
probability distribution for each input RV is defined in other 
MFrag in which it acts as a resident node. Context RVs are 
boolean nodes collectively specify conditions under which the 
local distributions for the resident RVs apply.   
A generative MTheory summarizes statistical regularities 
that characterize a domain and also introduces necessary 
mechanism to ensure these MFrags collectively satisfies 
consistency constraints and the existence of a unique joint 
probability distribution over an unbounded, possibly infinite 
number of instances of the RVs represented in each of the 
MFrags within the set [7]. To apply a generative MTheory into 
a specific scenario, we need to instantiate it with specific 
information to form a Situation-Specific Bayesian Network 
(SSBN). Then, standard Bayesian inference can be used on this 
SSBN to answer query (e.g., what is the probability of target 
asset to have a high risk level?), to refine the MTheory (e.g., 
each new evidence gives us additional statistical data to refine 
the local distributions of the RVs), and to refine our underlying 
PDO (e.g., the low applicability of the countermeasures can 
promote experts to identify more effective applicable 
countermeasures from the given requirements).  
One of the important advantages of MEBN is its clarity and 
modularity. This gives us a flexible and powerful way to build 
our knowledge base for a specific domain.   
TABLE  I. NPT OF NODE CM_COMPLEXITY 
Possible States Probability 
High 0.6 
Medium 0.3 
Low 0.1 
TABLE  II.  NPT OF NODE CM_EFFECTIVENESS 
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Figure 6. A Generative MTheory for Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model 
In addition, new MFrags can be added into MTheory 
without impacting existing ones, as long as these MFrags 
together satisfy the constraints (existence of a unique joint 
probability distribution) of the MTheory. Although other 
modeling techniques are also attractive, they are less suitable in 
the domain of risk assessment. As an example, OOBN provides 
a natural way to represent uncertainty about the attributes of 
instances of different types of objects (risk factor), but the 
problem of OOBN is that the instances of a same object have 
not only the same structure but also the same probability 
distribution. In real risk assessment process, the probability 
distribution of instances of the same object may have a big 
difference. For instance, if we have an object of “Threat 
Mitigates Vulnerability”, two instances can be “Threat T1 
mitigates Vulnerability V” and “Threat T2 mitigates 
Vulnerability V”, obviously, T1 and T2 may have totally 
different effect on vulnerability V, and thus we should assign 
different probability distribution to these two different threats 
instances. On the contrary, MEBN can easily represent this 
situation. 
2) Building MEBN Model for Risk Assessment  
Based on the BBN shown in Figure 5, we can extract 
relevant MFrags, then we can collect these MFrags to form an 
MTheory. Figure 6 shows an example of generative MTheory. 
The first MFrag is the Entity Type MFrag which is used to 
formally declare the possible types of entities in the model. 
Other MFrags are used to model the risk factors and their 
causal relationships.  
MEBN uses an expressive language to define the 
probability distributions for RVs. Due to the limited space, we 
only give the local distribution functions for the RVs 
VulnerabilityType(v),  Initial_Vulnerability(v) and 
Residual_Vulnerability(v), other local distribution functions 
and the default distributions are not shown here. 
Local distributions in standard BBNs are typically 
represented by static tables (NPTs), which limit each node to a 
fixed number of parents, while an instance of a RV in an 
MTheory might have any number of parents, because its 
parents are also RVs and can be instantiated as many times as 
necessary. We use pseudo-code suggested in [7] to convey the 
idea of using local distributions to specify probability 
distributions. It is possible that different people have different 
local distribution functions for the same RV.  
distribution [Software,Network,Others]=function{
for v in VulnerabilityType(v)){
if (Vi->v) then [Software:0.4,Network:0.2,Others:0.2]; 
}}  
Figure 7. Local Distribution for VulnerabilityType(v) 
Leaf RV has no parents and its distribution is assigned 
directly. Figure 7 gives an example to define the local 
distribution for leaf RV VulnerabilityType(v).  For any given 
vulnerability, the probability of vulnerability type to be 
“Software”, “Network”, “Others” is 0.4, 0.2, and 0.2, 
respectively. The vulnerability types and their probabilities can 
be different in a specific environment.   
Figure 8 defines the local distribution for RV 
Inherent_Vulnerability(v). This variable has its parents but 
they share the same ordinary variable. Thus, for each instance 
of Initial_Vulnerability(v), it has fixed number of parents, 
namely, the three instances of VulnerabilityType(v), 
ExplosureToPublic(v) and EaseofExploit(v). The same way 
to build the NPTs for nodes in the standard BBNs, we use 
description function to assign the probabilities covering all of 
the possible combinations of its parents.  
Figure 9 defines the local distribution for RV 
Residual_Vulnerability(v). This variable has parents and there 
is one external variable c in its parent CM_Effectiveness(c,v). 
distribution [Hi,Me,Lo]=function{
for v in parents(Inherent_Vulnerability(v)) {
if (Vi->c) {
if(ExplosureToPublic(Vi))==Hi && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Lo) then
[Hi:0.35,Me:0.5,Lo:0.15];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Hi && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then
[Hi:45,Me:25,Lo:3];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Lo && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Hi) then 
[Hi:0.2,Me:0.4,Lo:0.4];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Lo && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then 
[Hi:0.1,Me:0.3,Lo:0.6];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Me && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then 
case VulnerabilityType(v)){
Software:[Hi:0.4,Me:0.25,Lo:0.35];
Network:[Hi:0.2,Me:0.3,Lo:0.5];
Others:[Hi:0.1,Me:0.1,Lo:0.8];
}
else [Lo:15,Me:30,Hi:55];
}}}
Figure 8. Local Distribution for 
Inherent_Vulnerability(v) 
distribution [Hi,Me,Lo]=function{
for c,v in parents(Residual_Vulnerability(v)) {
if any(Ci->c) { 
if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Hi then 
[Hi: 1-min(1:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.6, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.4]
else if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Me then 
[Hi: 0.6-min(0.6:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.8, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.2] 
else if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Lo then 
[Hi: 0.2-min(0.2:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.2, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.8]
}} }
Figure 9. Local Distribution for 
Residual_Vulnerability(v) 
(5) in Figure 6 
(6) in Figure 6 
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In this situation, the instances of CM_Effectiveness(c,v) 
depend on the number of countermeasures which can mitigate 
this vulnerability in the given scenario, therefore, we must take 
the number of countermeasures into account. For example, as 
shown in Figure 10, if there are two countermeasures !C0 
(entity identifier, begins with an exclamation point, represent 
an instance of an entity) and !C1 can mitigate the 
vulnerability !V. When the Inherent_Vulnerability(!V) is High, 
the CM_Effectiveness(!C0,!V) is High and 
CM_Effectiveness(!C1,!V) is Medium, we can identify the 
number of countermeasure with High, Medium, Low 
effectiveness are 1, 1, 0, respectively.  According to the local 
distribution described in Figure 9, the final probability 
distribution for Residual_Vulnerability(!V) will be [Hi:1-
min(1:(0.8*1+0.6*1+0.4*0)), Me:(1-Hi)*0.6, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.4], 
namely, [Hi:0,Me:0.6,Lo:0.4]  as shown in Figure 10. 
By modeling risk assessment using MEBN logic, each risk 
factor is represented by a corresponding RV which can be 
instantiated dynamically as many times as necessary, so all the 
risk factors in the given scenario can be treated at the instance 
level. In addition, MEBN logic provides a consistent, flexible 
way to define the local probabilities for the RVs. Through this 
way, different group stakeholders will have a clear common 
understanding about how the original information is collected, 
how these information are combined or integrated, how these 
information are transformed from one node to other nodes and 
how these information are used to support or deny an argument  
from the risk assessment.  The risk components and causal 
relationships in the Risk Model have their corresponding 
matches in the MTheory. Other relationships become the 
foundation or context of the operational scenario under which 
the MTheory is applied. Therefore, we can assume that the 
MTheory is consistent with the Requirements and Risk Model 
in our discourse of domain. The complete mappings between 
Risk Model and MTheory are shown in Table III.  
3) Inference by using MEBN model for Risk Assessment  
The generative MTheory must be instantiated into an SSBN 
to compute the response to a query under the given scenario. 
Although the generative MTheory in Figure 6 implicitly 
represents infinite possible operational scenarios in our domain, 
we take the simplest one, namely, there is only one instance for 
each type risk component, to demonstrate how it can be used in 
a real risk assessment. Figure 11 illustrates a SSBN instantiated 
from the generative MTheory. We assume the instances of risk 
components in this simplest scenario are asset !A(ENCLAVE), 
threat !T(UNAUTHORIZED INTERNET ACCESS), 
vulnerability !V(FIREWALL AND IDS MIS-
CONFIGURATION), countermeasure !C(INSTALL 
FIREWALLS & IDS AT KEY POINTS IN THE ENCLAVE 
WITH APPROPRIATE CONFIGURATIONS), These 
scenario specific information is used to instantiate the MTheory 
and create instances of RVs. The details of the algorithm and 
processes of how to construct SSBN are in [7] [24]. 
After the SSBN has been constructed, it can be treated as a 
standard BBN. When a query (which contains a finding set of 
particular information about the situation and a target set of the 
nodes of interests) comes into SSBN, the inference works the 
same way as a standard BBN to calculate the response for input 
query. For example, Figure 11 can answer a set of query: 
“When there is a threat DDoS can_exploit the Software 
vulnerability while suggested countermeasure type is 
Network with low complexity, high usability and medium 
maintenance, what is the risk of asset A?” Or “what is the 
countermeasure applicability of C?”.  
TABLE III.   THE MAPPING BETWEEN RISK MODEL AND MTHEORY  
(Requirements and Risk Model ) => (Generative MTheory) 
(Security Requirements and Assets, Security Requirements suggest Countermeasures, 
Security Requirements prevent Vulnerabilities, Security Requirements driven by 
Threats, Countermeasures have Vulnerabilities, Security Requirements apply to 
Assets) => (The operational scenario under which the risk components are discovered 
and the MTheory applied to assess the risk of the given assets)  
(Threats) => (Threat_Potential(t,v), and Threat Potential MFrag)  
(Vulnerabilities) => (Inherentl_Vulnerability(v), Inherent Vulnerability MFrag and 
Residual_Vulnerability(v), Residual Vulnerability  MFrag)  
(Countermeasures) => (CM_Effectiveness(cm,v)) 
(Risks) => (RiskOfAsset(a)) 
(Mission Criticality) => (Mission_Criticality(a)) 
(Threat Exploit Vulnerabilities, Threats increase risks, Threats damage assets, Assets 
have mission criticality, Vulnerabilities lead to risks) => (Risk of Asset Assessment 
MFrag)  
(Countermeasures mitigate Vulnerabilities) => (Residual Vulnerability MFrag) 
(Countermeasures reduce risks) => (Ignored since the countermeasures reduce the 
risks by mitigating the vulnerabilities) 
 
Simple sensitivity analysis and comparison can be done 
based on Figure 11 to support the decision making process. For 
example, in order to reduce the risk of A, we can either 
improve the maintenance of countermeasure or apply a new 
countermeasure. So we can fix other conditions and only 
change the CM_Maintenance(!C) from High to Low, we can 
get corresponding results of RiskOfAsset(!A), as shown in 
Table IV. Similarly, we can check CM_Type(!C) and make 
another table, as shown in Table V. Therefore, we can find out 
that changing the countermeasure type is more cost-effective 
than improving the maintenance of countermeasure.  These 
types of sensitivity analysis and comparisons can be used to 
support the complex decision-making and help finding the 
“best” solution to reduce the risk of target asset. 
MEBN can be instantiated in a systematic way and the final 
SSBN can be generated automatically. For example, some risk 
factors have multiple instances and the risk assessment scenario 
can be described as follows: The target asset !A0 (ENCLAVE) 
may be damaged by threats !T0 (UNAUTHORIZED 
INTERNET ACCESS) and !T1 (UNAUTHORIZED 
NETWORK TRAFFIC) which may exploit the 
vulnerabilities !V0 (INTERNET ACCESS NOT 
PROXIED), !V1 (FIREWALL AND IDS MIS-
CONFIGURATION) and !V2 (USE OF TAMPERED 
SOFTWARE), to mitigate the vulnerabilities, the suggested 
countermeasure are !C0 (INSTALL FIREWALLS & IDS AT 
KEY POINTS IN THE ENCLAVE WITH APPROPRIATE 
CONFIGURATIONS) and !C1(MANAGED INTERNET 
ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (DMZ)). Based on the above 
information, the generative MTheory can be instantiated to a 
new SSBN (top of Figure 12) that has relevant RVs and 
MFrags instantiated multiple times. The bottom of Figure 12 
shows a subset (the shadowed part) of the SSBN shown in the 
top of Figure 12.     
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 Figure 11. SSBN for the simplest risk assessment scenario  
 
Figure 12. Generated SSBN for the simple risk assessment scenario (Top) + Details of the subset of SSBN (Bottom) 
TABLE IV.  NPT OF NODE 
CM_MAINTENANCE  
CM_Mainte 
nance(!C) 
 
Cost 
RiskOf 
Asset(!A) 
High $1000 [0.4,0.2,0.4] 
Medium $500 [0.5,0.2,0.3] 
Low $200 [0.6,0.2,0.2] 
 
TABLE V.  NPT OF NODE CM_TYPE 
CM_  
Type 
(!C) 
Cost 
RiskOf 
Asset(!A) 
Network  $1000 [0.1,0.2,0.7] 
Software $500 [0.4,0.3,0.3] 
Others $200 [0.6,0.2,0.2] 
 
Figure 10. Example of local 
distribution calculation 
The process of inference in MEBN Model 
for Risk Assessment: 
 
 Specify the operational scenario, identify 
the relevant risk components. 
 Based on the information in the given 
operational scenario, construct the SSBN 
by creating and combining instances of 
the MFrags in the generative MTheory. 
 Create query and apply standard 
Bayesian network inference algorithm in 
SSBN 
 Answering the query by inspecting the 
posterior probabilities of the target 
nodes. 
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This subset contains two MFrags, “Threat Potential 
MFrag” and “Risk of Asset MFrag”. Based on the given 
operational scenario and the constraints of the context node 
such as v=CanBeExploitedBy(t), assume that threat !T0 can 
only exploit vulnerability !V0, whilst !T1 can exploit 
vulnerabilities !V0, !V1 and !V2 to represent the risk level of 
asset !A0, use (!T0 and !V0), (!T1 and !V0), (!T1 and !V1), 
(!T1  and !V2) to instantiate the RVs and two MFrags, then we 
will get one instance of Mission_Criticality(a) and 
RiskOfAsset(a), two instances of Threat_Type(t) and 
Threat_Frequence(t), three instances of  
Vulnerability_Type(v) and Residual_Vulnerability(v), and 
four instances of  Threat_Potential(t,v).   Since the number of 
risk factors in real-world risk assessment case can be huge, this 
paper uses the open source software, UnBBayes tool [4], to 
compute with MEBN models.  
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we introduce the use of BBNs and MEBN 
logic to overcome the limited expressiveness and model the 
process of risk assessment and analyze the correlations among 
different risk components. This paper presents a step-by-step 
approach to indentify the risk related factors based on the Risk 
Model and build a causal model for the probabilistic risk 
assessment. By using MEBN logic, we build a generative 
MTheory for risk assessment which implicitly represents 
infinite possible operational scenarios in the domain of risk 
assessment. The generative MTheory for Risk Assessment can 
be instantiated by using the specific information in the given 
operational scenario; therefore our model can treat each 
individual instance of risk components dynamically and 
process automatically. Our current model is based on a simple 
operational scenario and there is an implicit assumption in our 
model, that the relevant risk components are completely 
discovered via security requirements. But in a real-world 
situation, it is highly possible that the risk components may not 
be fully discovered. Therefore, it is very important to take 
advantage of the known explorative study on the types of 
threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures for different kinds 
of platforms and situations.  We plan to apply our models and 
methods into more complex operational scenarios which 
contain multiple correlated requirements from different level of 
abstractions, with the extension of the models to support the 
temporal recursion. We will also develop a well-designed case 
study to experiment and validate our Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment Model.   
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